1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
2	CENTRAL DIVISION
3	LAURA LYNN HAMMETT
4	Plaintiff No. 4: 21-cv-00189-LPR Vs. June 14, 2023
5	Little Rock, Arkansas PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC
6	Defendant
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9	TRANSCRIPT OF RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEE P. RUDOFSKY
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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13	APPEARANCES:
14	On Behalf of the Plaintiff:
15	LAURA LYNN HAMMETT Pro Se Plaintiff
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17	On Behalf of the Defendant:
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23 24	Drocoodings reported by machine stangaronby and
24 25	Proceedings reported by machine stenography and displayed in realtime; transcript prepared utilizing
26	computer-aided transcription.

THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate very much everybody's extensive briefing on all of the various motions. I also appreciate everybody's argument today. I also appreciate everybody's patience while I ran down a few things that -- that you were all telling me. I have done all of that.

I have also spent a consider amount of time, especially in this last week, poring over all of your various submissions, both -- both sides, my consolidated order, and all of the facts in the record. I am at a point where I feel like I am ready to rule.

I am going to rule orally. Obviously, the court reporter is here, and she can prepare a transcript, and this transcript will be considered my written order for purposes of both the summary judgment motion and the motion to -- and the motion to reconsider.

Let me start with the defendant's summary judgment motion. I am going to grant that motion for a number of different reasons. Primarily, what I will tell you is, after going through all of the material in the record, after going through everybody's arguments, and after reviewing my consolidated order, I do believe that my consolidated order still gets right what the record reflects in terms of what a rational juror would and would not conclude about this case or -- or would certainly conclude and could not conclude otherwise.

I don't think there is a genuine dispute over Ms. Hammett owing the \$2,297.63. And I am going to adopt for purposes of resolving this motion both the factual background that I provided in the previous order, the consolidated order, and also and in particular footnote 463 of that order where I specifically go through what in the record makes it clear to me that no rational juror could find -- could find that Ms. Hammett did not owe this -- this debt. And so, therefore, there is no genuine dispute.

I will say I recognize that, for purposes of the summary judgment motion, that there is some more evidence, at least arguable evidence, that relates to this question, the question being under 1690 -- 15 U.S.C.§1692e(2)(A), whether -- whether PRA, in -- in collecting this debt or in connection with collecting this debt, was -- made false or fraudulent statements -- or I guess made false or misrepresentative statements about the existence -- well, I guess about the character or amount of the -- of the debt.

I will say that none of that subsequent evidence, to the extent one can characterize it as evidence, suggests to me that any rational juror would conclude or could conclude that PRA's statements were false, meaning that Ms. -- Ms. Hammett actually did not owe the debt or that

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the debt was not the 2200 and change figure that I've -- that I've discussed.

I want to say a couple of more specific things, and this actually applies to both the summary judgment and the motion for reconsideration. I will say I appreciate and accept Ms. Hammett's discovery that I had a drafting error in footnote 463. I said at one point in that footnote that Ms. Hammett in her affidavit said, quote, I am a consumer in respect to any debt incurred by me on a credit card issued by Capital One Bank USA in or about 2001, period. And as Ms. Hammett correctly points out, that period was too early and chopped off the rest of the The full sentence is, I am a consumer in respect to any debt incurred by me on a credit card issued by Capital One Bank USA in or about 2001, comma, as I used any credit card to purchase household items, food, and other consumer items, period, close quote.

I hope that is the correct -- is the correct iteration of it. I am going off of page 6 of Ms.

Hammett's brief in support of opposition to the defendant's supplement motion for summary judgment. But I agree that I should not have chopped off the sentence with the period. I take responsibility for that.

Having said that, the last clause does not change anything in my mind. It does not create more -- a more

favorable situation for Ms. Hammett were this to go to a jury than she had before. In fact, if it does anything, it hurts her, but I just don't think it makes any difference one way or the -- or the other.

Additionally, I -- while it's sort of after the fact
-- after-the-fact declarations that the Eighth Circuit
really tells me not to consider, I will even consider that
Ms. Hammett changed her statement from not believing that
she owed the debt to saying she -- she knows she didn't
owe the debt. That's an incredibly conclusory statement,
especially given all the other statements that Ms. Hammett
has made in both the record and also here at -- at oral
argument. Whatever you want to characterize her ultimate
statement as a belief or -- or knowledge, she does not
have and has not come forward with any evidence from which
a rational jury could say that PRA's statements that there
was a debt and that it was \$2,297.63 and that she owed it
was false or misleading.

I also will add that, in addition to the evidence that I cited in note 463, I do think it is worth highlighting that at page 92 and 93 of Ms. Hammett's deposition, when she was talking about her discussions with Capital One -- and I should say, I think at least at the summary judgment stage, I can include this information in my finding pursuant to the residual exception of the

hearsay rule. I'll also note that Ms. Hammett didn't object to -- to this information as hearsay, but nonetheless, Ms. Hammett said "they" -- and in this context, she's talking about Capital One. They did say that they had a charge off for the \$2,297.63 but, you know, they didn't have anything else. Then she goes on and adds more to that, but it doesn't take away from what she -- from what she said in what I just read.

That is another helpful piece of the record that shows why no rational juror could conclude otherwise than I'm concluding here, which is that, based on this record, it is definitively established that Ms. Hammett owed the \$2,297.63. And, so consequently, PRA's representation of that fact was -- was not false or misleading -- or their representation of those facts.

I will also say, while I'm not going to go into as much detail, I do agree with defendant's position that the complaint was limited to -- the operative complaint was limited to writings. Ms. Hammett is very clear on that in paragraph 316 and -- and her complaint is very thorough. So this is not a situation where somebody can't write a complaint and doesn't know what to say. Ms. Hammett knows how to express herself in my view, and it very clearly was just talking about the writings.

Quite frankly, I don't think ultimately that makes

any difference, but I will also associate myself with the defendant's argument that none of those writings had as an animating purpose the collection of the debt, which under binding Eighth Circuit precedent means that they fall outside of 15 U.S.C.§1692e(2)(A). I think the same thing, quite frankly, is true of the call in February, even were we to get there.

I will also say that I have significant concerns -- although I am not going to rule on this, I will flag it for the Eighth Circuit. I have significant concerns that under TransUnion and Spokeo, the recent Supreme Court cases on this issue, that Ms. Hammett does not actually have a concrete injury that flows from the oral or written communications of the existence of this debt or the amount.

Let me start with the amount. To the extent that Ms. Hammett is saying that the amount of the debt is incorrect but there was some debt, there's basically zero concrete injury -- or there is zero concrete injury that could -- that could flow from that because, if it was \$1,900 instead of \$2,300, there's -- there's nothing that -- that happened to Ms. Hammett even on her own -- on her own telling. There's nothing that happened to Ms. Hammett because she was told the wrong number. And that's especially true, of course, since, basically, a month or

so or maybe a little bit after that, after she was first told of the existence and the amount of the debt, it was then marked down to zero by the company -- by PRA.

To the extent that we're not talking about just an incorrect amount, but we're talking about overall whether or not Ms. Hammett had the debt at all, it strikes me that there's no injury directly tied to that.

And recall, here, we're not talking about the large number of calls she got prior to -- prior to February of 2018. We're not talking about letters she -- that were sent to her but never received by her. We are really talking about the -- at most even, if one includes the February 18 call, we're talking about the February 18 call, we're talking about the February 18 call, we're talking about the -- the dispute letter which, again, as I've said before, did not have an animating purpose to collect a debt. And then pretty quickly after that, the debt was marked down to zero. So we're really only talking about whether injury flows from the February 18, 2020, call.

And my point here is, I don't think under what Spokeo and TransUnion have said that there's any sort of similar in-kind traditional common law tort that would -- that would -- that would -- that sort of evokes the same injuries as the injuries we're talking about here.

Obviously, there's no monetary injury here. I mean,

I understand that Ms. Hammett decided to file a lawsuit, but that was Ms. Hammett's choice. There was no sort of litigation of collecting -- of trying to collect a debt on the part of PRA. So it's not like Ms. Hammett had to -- had to defend a lawsuit. There's -- there's really no suggestion of any injury in terms of monetary value. And in terms of physical -- of physical injury or emotional injury, I don't really know of any common law sort of similar injury where it comes from somebody merely lying to you when there are no other consequences.

I mean, I understand there's the tort of false -false pretenses and there are misrepresentation torts, but
all of those, there's some kind of consequence of somebody
-- you know, of the person who is being faked out losing
money or paying money or having some other injury. And I
don't think there's -- there's a tight enough correlation
here.

I accept, of course, that Congress can sort of make a de facto injury into a de jure injury and can sort of expand -- well, maybe not expand. They can emphasize or bring up something that might have only been a -- a sort of very negligible injury into a statutory injury, but they can't create the injuries where there were none to begin with.

So I do have significant standing concerns here. I'm

not basing my ruling on that, but, obviously, that doesn't matter because the Eighth Circuit has an independent obligation to -- to look at jurisdictional issues here anyway.

I think what I've said is probably enough to explain why I am granting the summary judgment motion.

On to the motion for reconsideration. I am going to deny the motion for reconsideration. And I will say, basically and primarily the reason I'm denying it is because almost everything that Ms. Hammett argues is not new evidence. It's essentially re-argument of issues that the Court has already decided. I don't think it's appropriate for reconsideration. Even if it was appropriate for reconsideration, I don't think any of those arguments are persuasive and suggest that I made a mistake.

As I've said -- I've already explained sort of the two things that Ms. Hammett pointed out that I thought were important and I've addressed them: namely, the one sort of writing -- drafting error that I made and why that doesn't matter; and then, number two, that instead of saying she believes, now she says she knows, but I've already explained why that doesn't matter either.

The -- again, the only other issue here is the potentially new evidence of the -- I want to make sure I

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say it right -- the Mejia case and the other documents that Ms. Hammett provided very recently in the -- in the last couple of days, you know, so the 2023 consent order and -- and submissions around that.

I really don't think that is evidence of anything. It obviously doesn't paint PRA in a good light and it obviously suggests that -- that, in other instances at least, PRA has done some things wrong, but I don't believe that it really has any relevance at all to our case, at least it has not in my view been sufficiently explained how it directly bears on our case, and I'm -- I can't assume that this happened in our case because it happened in Mejia -- or I can't assume bad things happened in our case because bad things happened in Mejia potentially. Obviously, you know, there was a significant settlement in Mejia, but also just as obviously, in terms of the consent order, I understand that the defendants there did not -or I should say, PRA there did not admit liability, for whatever that's worth. Just, quite frankly, I don't think it's very relevant to the issues here.

So given all of that, I am going to -- like I said, I'm denying the motions for reconsideration. I'm granting the defendant's supplemental motion for summary judgment. And as you all know because I've said it earlier, I am granting Ms. Hammett's motion to disclose the expert

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    report as I've discussed it.
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        Would you all please hold on one moment.
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               As to the summary judgment motion and the
    motion for reconsideration, I am -- I've concluded my oral
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            Let me ask this -- and this is not a time for
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    re-argument. If you go beyond my question, either of you,
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    I'm going to make it very clear you shouldn't.
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        Let me start with PRA's counsel. Is there anything
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    that I didn't address in that order that specifically you
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    think I need to address?
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                 KOMISIN: Your Honor, the one potential
             MR.
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    issue is the motion to compel arbitration contained within
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    the first motion to reconsider, Docket Number 194.
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    However, I believe, absent any showing of the terms and
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    conditions, that that's functionally been mooted at this
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    point, but that's the only potential hanging chad, so to
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    speak.
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             THE COURT: That's -- that's fair. You're
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    talking about the alternative ground from the motion for
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    reconsideration. To the -- to the extent that's still a
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    live issue, I'm going to deny it.
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        We don't have the contract. I don't see the
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               The contract is not in the record.
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    understand Ms. Hammett's arguments about it from the
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    briefing real well, but I don't think there is anything I
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can do absent it not being -- absent it being in the record. And, of course, we are way past sort of the point for arbitration motions at this point.

Anything else, Mr. Komisin?

Look, the reason I'm asking you -- and I'm going ask
Ms. Hammett the same question. But at least from your
side, the reason I'm asking you is because you're going to
be the ones defending this order when it goes up on
appeal. So is there anything I haven't addressed that
you'd like me specifically to address?

MR. KOMISIN: No, Your Honor. I believe Your Honor's ruling was very clear and specific, and I appreciate the time you put into it.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Hammett, I'm sure you're not happy. I understand that. We -- you and I obviously have a disagreement on the law here that's applicable and the facts, and that's fair and that will -- that will sort of work itself out at the Eighth Circuit. And if the Eighth Circuit sends it back, I will deal with the case with all deliberate speed.

But I want to know if there's something -- and please, this is -- again, this is not a chance to sort of have -- do like a monologue, but is there something, a particular piece of evidence that you think I haven't sufficiently addressed; again, not whether you agree with

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how I've addressed it, but you want me to address it one
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    way or the other?
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             MS. HAMMETT: The issue of whether it was a
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    violation of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy to
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    continue to call me and demand that I give them
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    information about myself before I knew who they were.
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             THE COURT: I am -- I am happy to address that.
    The Fourth Amendment is not applicable to private
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    corporations. It only constrains the government.
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        Anything else?
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             MS. HAMMETT: No. I have a question that -- are
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    you asking about the Rule 11 motion?
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             THE COURT:
                         Well, no. We're going to get to
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    that in a second. I'm asking if there's -- if there's
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    anything specifically in the -- in the decision I just
16
    made on the motions I just made that you -- you think I
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    didn't talk about a particular thing that is really
18
    important to talk about and you need -- you feel like you
    need a ruling on it from me.
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             MS. HAMMETT: I understand you.
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             THE COURT:
                         Okay. So I'm going to take that as
22
    a no.
23
             MS. HAMMETT:
                           Correct.
24
             THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
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        Now we can talk about other things that are still
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    pending. So Mr. -- I'm terrible. I'm sorry. It is
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    Komisin or Komisin?
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             MR. KOMISIN: It's Komisin, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         Komisin. Look at that.
                                                   Okav.
5
    don't feel that bad because everybody butchers my last
6
    name.
7
        So, Mr. Komisin, I think there are some outstanding
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    motions, but I don't really know if they're sort of moot
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    now, at least -- at least some of them. For example, I
10
    think there is a motion to -- to quash a subpoena.
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        Do you recall that one?
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                 KOMISIN: I believe that's been ruled upon,
13
    Your Honor. I can pull up the docket entry, but if I'm
14
    not mistaken, it's the subpoena that was issued to
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    Verizon, Ms. Hammett's cellphone provider. Ms. Hammett
16
    stated that she spoke with them and that they said they
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    have nothing responsive to give. And so, essentially,
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    that -- it's ruled as a moot motion. I can find that
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    order that --
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             THE COURT: No. I think I -- I think I'm
21
    talking about something different. I think I'm talking
22
    about Document 133. There's a motion to quash from Jana
23
    Perry about some kind of audio recording in Searcy county.
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             MR. KOMISIN: Yes. I believe that's mooted by
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    Your Honor's ruling. And I think the subpoena was in all
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But I

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candor for evidence in a separate case anyway.
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    believe with the summary judgment being granted, there's
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    no longer any plausible scenario where that evidence could
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    be beneficial here.
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             THE COURT:
                         Ms. Hammett, your thoughts.
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             MS. HAMMETT: Not unless we're moving forward,
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    that would be moot.
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             THE COURT: I'm going to find then that Document
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    133, the motion to quash, is moot.
10
        So I think then that leaves, Ms. Hammett, your
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    sanctions motion, correct?
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             MS. HAMMETT: Correct.
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             THE COURT:
                         That one, if I remember correctly, I
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    said we are -- we're -- we're not moving forward on until
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    14 days after I lift the stay, which I would lift after
16
    I've decided summary judgment.
17
        Mr. Komisin, any reason I shouldn't at this point, at
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    least after I enter the text orders, any reason I
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    shouldn't lift the stay and then have you respond to the
20
    sanctions motion within 14 days?
21
                 KOMISIN:
                            No. Your Honor.
             MR.
22
             THE COURT: All right. Ms. Hammett, any problem
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    with me proceeding that way?
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             MS. HAMMETT: If I'm understanding you, you're
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    just giving them 14 days?
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Well, yeah. So I'm going to enter
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             THE COURT:
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    -- I'm going to enter the text orders that will dispose of
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    this case in terms of summary judgment and also dispose of
    the other motions. I'm going to enter them either today
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    or tomorrow morning, and then I will lift the stay and
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6
    give them 14 days to respond to your sanctions motion, at
7
    which point I will either decide it on the briefs or I
8
    will ask for another hearing.
9
             MS. HAMMETT: Yes.
                                  That sound reasonable.
10
             THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else have any other
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    motion or anything we need to talk about?
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        Let me start with Mr. Komisin.
13
                           Your Honor, I believe there's one
             MR. KOMISIN:
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                  It's Ms. Hammett's motion in limine to limit
    last motion.
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    Dr. Adhia's proposed testimony, Docket Number 70. I
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    believe Your Honor took that under advisement until the
17
    remaining pending motions were resolved. PRA's position
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    is that has been mooted by --
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             THE COURT: I think that's probably right, but
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    let me ask Ms. Hammett for her thoughts.
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             MS. HAMMETT:
                            That's been mooted.
22
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
                                So then to the extent I
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    haven't already done something on it, I will find that to
24
    be mooted.
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             MS. HAMMETT: I have a question, just because
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    I'm not an attorney and this is all new to me.
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        So if you moot something but then the appellate court
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    says, come back, and, you know, we're going to redo this,
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    then do I have to -- do I have to do those motions all
5
    over again?
6
             THE COURT: You do. You do.
7
             MS. HAMMETT: Or do we take the moot out?
                              You'll need to do them all over
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             THE COURT:
                         No.
9
    again.
            I mean --
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             MS. HAMMETT:
                           Oh.
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             THE COURT: That's -- that's just the way those
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    things go.
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                                 Then I'd have to consider for
             MS. HAMMETT:
                           0h.
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    a moment whether that is actually good for either the
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    Perry -- Perry quashing that, because I don't want to
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    quash it and I don't know what the next statute of
17
    limitations are and --
18
             THE COURT: Well, really right -- really right
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    now I just want you -- I just want to give you the ability
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    to give me your thoughts on whether these are mooted or
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    not and then I'm going to decide.
22
             MS. HAMMETT: Oh, okay. Then I'll let you do
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    that research because I don't know the answer to that, but
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    that -- I would hate to --
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             THE COURT: I understand you don't -- I got it.
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You don't want to concede that they're mooted.
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    fine. I under -- I understand that. I -- I believe they
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    are both mooted in this situation so I am going to moot
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    both of -- both of those motions.
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        Mr. Komisin, from your side, anything else?
             MR. KOMISIN: No, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Hammett, anything else in
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    terms of something you think I haven't decided or
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    anythi ng?
             MS. HAMMETT: No, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Okay. We are -- we are adjourned.
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         (Proceedings adjourned at 1:34 p.m.)
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14
                       REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
15
        I, Valarie D. Flora, FCRR, RPR, certify that the
16
    foregoing is a correct transcript of proceedings in the
17
    above-entitled matter.
18
    Dated this the 14th day of June, 2023.
19
    /s/ Valarie D. Flora, FCRR
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21
    United States Court Reporter
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